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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Respondent, having only raised one issue presented for appellate review, defers to 
appellate's brief in conjunction with Rule 24(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
following issue is presented for review by this appeal on behalf of Respondent: 
1. Should the appellate court award Respondent reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 
Rule 24(k) and 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1953 as amended)? Because this issue is not 
an appeal from a trial court decision, this would be considered a matter of "first impression", and is 
left to the sole discretion of the appellate court. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, or rules determinative of or pertinent to the 
issues presented for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Once again, Respondent defers to Rule 24(b)(1) deferring to Appellants statement of the case. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly changed custody from the Petitioner to the Respondent after a two 
(2) day non-jury trial which involved multiple witnesses as well as testimony elicited from three (3) 
expert witnesses. 
The trial court properly considered whether or not there had, in fact, been a change of 
circumstances and relied on Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) as well as §30-3-10.4(l)(a) 
(1953 as amended) and the trial court further relied upon stipulation of the parties during the trial 
in this matter that the joint custody arrangement previously stipulated to was no longer workable 
(Trial Transcript @ 474 "hereinafter Tr."). 
In addition, the Petitioner completely misstates the holding and rational as set forth in 
Parvzek v. Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989). Even though the trial court found in the case at 
bar that the child was happy and well adjusted, the trial court findings also reflected the basis for its 
conclusion that other factors outweigh the child's interest in stability of the home environment. 
Further, during the custody evaluation itself, the Petitioner arbitrarily uprooted the minor child from 
his home in Layton, Utah, and moved the child to the State of Arizona. The Court of Appeals in 
Parvzek, ruled that the child's interest in stability of the present environment is one of numerous 
factors to be considered in a custody determination, (emphasis added). 
The Trial Court Judge also drew the proper conclusions of law from the findings of fact it 
made in this case as it relates to Rule 4-903, Code of Judicial Administration and made detailed 
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findings for each factor outlined in said rule as are set forth in the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated the 7th day of May, 1998 (Appellant Brief add. no. 1, pg. 6 -11). 
As it relates to the custody evaluation, it was not flawed and was conducted properly in all 
respects. On or about April 29,1997 the above entitled court ordered a custody evaluator after both 
sides were given the opportunity to submit, and did submit proposed custody evaluators. The 
evaluation was not permeated by ex parte contact with Respondent and/or his family; and/or, 
particularly, with Respondent's counsel. To the contrary, the only time Respondent's counsel 
discussed the testimony to be given by the custody evaluator was the day of trial and, further, it was 
Respondent's counsel who subpoenaed Margaret Chapman to testify at trial. 
Finally, the trial court properly awarded Respondent his attorneys fees and the basis for 
awarding Respondent his attorneys fees as set forth in the trial courts ruling dated August 12,1998 
(Appellant Brief add. no. 7). The trial court told counsel for Petitioner that he "should have known 
better than to have attempted to support such motions with various inappropriate affidavits, letters, 
and exhibits, in essentially attempting to re-try the case with evidence that could have been presented 
at trial". 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were married on November 3, 1989 (R. 1). 
2. One child was born as issue of the marriage, Jackson Wade Carpenter born May 28,1992 
(R.1). 
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3. The parties separated for the last time in mid-May 1994 (R.480) 
4. The parties were granted a Decree of divorce, which was final by its terms on January 2, 
1995 (R.24). 
5. The Petitioner properly states in her statement of the facts that the parties stipulated and 
agreed that the custody of the minor child, Jackson Wade Carpenter should be shared jointly by the 
parties, with Petitioner being awarded the physical custody and control of the minor child, and 
reasonable rights of visitation awarded to Respondent (R.24,25). However, the Petitioner attempts 
to mislead this court as to the custody status when looking at Petitioner's brief under Table of 
Contents, specifically, Point I (A) whereby the Petitioner states "the parties stipulated that 
Respondent [sic] should have sole physical custody of the child and Petitioner has done an excellent 
job as primary caretaker since December 23,1994". First of all, Petitioner inadvertently put in the 
word "Respondent" where the word "Petitioner" should have been and, secondly, the parties never 
stipulated that the Petitioner should have had sole physical custody, (emphasis added). 
6. At the time the parties were divorced, the minor child was approximately 18 months old 
(Tr. 158). 
7. After the divorce and prior to Respondent relocating to Brian Head, State of Utah, he was 
with his child on a daily basis providing for his daily needs (Tr. 159-163). 
8. Prior to Respondent's relocation to Brian Head, Utah, he had discussions with Petitioner 
about visitation with Jackson and, in fact, the Petitioner actually encouraged Respondent to move 
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to Brian Head (Tr. 165). 
9. Prior to the Petitioner filing her Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking an 
increase in child support, the Respondent had discussed with his attorney the problems he was 
beginning to have with Petitioner as it related to visitation of the parties minor child and other 
various concerns and discussed a change of custody with his lawyer in May or June, 1996 (Tr. 171). 
10. On the 2nd day of October, 1996, Petitioner filed her Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce seeking an increase in child support (R.30). 
11. On the 20th day of November, 1996, Respondent answered Petitioner's Petition and filed 
a Counter-Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce alleging that the original order of the Court 
granting joint custody had become unworkable, and requested the Court to award him sole custody 
of the parties minor child (R. 31). 
12. After the Respondent filed a Counter-Petition seeking custody of his son, the Petitioner 
decreased the visitation Respondent was previously getting (Tr.95). 
13. At the time Petitioner filed her Petition to Modify she was represented by attorney David 
R. Hamilton who withdrew from the case on August 27,1997, after the custody evaluation had been 
complete (R.68). 
14. Counsel for Respondent and then counsel for Petitioner, Mr. David R. Hamilton, were 
unable to agree on a custody evaluator and, therefore, both sides submitted written requests to the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin who appointed Margaret Chapman of St. George, Utah, to be the 
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custody evaluator in this matter on the 24th day of April, 1997 (R.61, 62). (Appellee add. no. 1). 
15. Thereafter, Petitioner hired Mr. Brent Chipman, who entered his appearance of counsel 
shortly thereafter (R. 68). 
16. On or about July 10, 1997, Petitioner moved with the minor child to Gilbert, Arizona, 
where she co-habitated with Mr. Craig Hudema, prior to her marriage. (Appellants add. 1, Appellants 
Brief, pg. 816). 
17. The Petitioner did not marry Mr. Hudema until August 29,1997 (Tr.86). 
18. Even after Respondents relocation to Brian Head, Utah, but prior to Respondent filing 
his Counter-Petition seeking custody of his minor son, he was visiting with his child approximately 
10-15 days per month (Tr. 94). 
19. On or about August 21, 1997, Margaret Chapman completed her child custody 
evaluation and submitted it to the Court and the parties (R.120, ex. D-10). 
20. The trial was held in this matter on December 3 and 4,1997, with Petitioner represented 
by Brent Chipman and Respondent represented by James M. Park (R.725- 726). 
21. At the end of the trial, the Court gave its ruling and awarded sole custody of the parties 
minor child to Respondent. 
22. After completion of the trial but prior to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
being prepared, Petitioner fired her second attorney, Mr. Brent Chipman and hired Larry R. Keller, 
her third lawyer, who entered his appearance on March 10, 1998 (R. 123, 124). 
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23. The Trial Judge entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by date of May 7, 
1998 (R.581-594). 
24. While the trial court did enter its Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce on May 7,1998 
(Appellants Brief Add. No. 2), which did not state it is in Jackson's best interest to change custody, 
the Court focused on nothing more than Jackson's best interests in its detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated May 7, 1998 (Appellants Brief add. no. 1). 
25. After Petitioner hired her third attorney, after the trial in this matter, he filed a plethora 
of motions which included the following: 
a. Petitioner's Motion for New Trial and Memorandum associated therewith; 
b. Petitioner's Motion to Open Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P.; 
c. Motion for Second Custody Evaluation and Memorandum associated 
therewith; 
d. Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment and Change of 
Custody and Memorandum associated therewith; 
e. Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment under U.R.C.P., Rule 60(b)(1), 
and Memorandum associated therewith (filed May 5, 1998) (R.164 - 425); 
26. Respondent filed responses to each of these motions and the Trial Judge denied each 
motion after a hearing on May 19, 1998, by order dated June 24, 1998 (Appellants Brief, Add. 3) 
(R.615-632;R.710-711). 
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27. Not only was each motion filed by Petitioner denied, but attorney for Petitioner was told 
by the Court that he "knew better than to have filed inappropriate affidavits, letters, and exhibits in 
support thereof and awarded Respondent attorneys fees (Appellant Brief, Add. 7). 
28. Petitioner, after losing at the trial stage, and having various motions for new trial and 
other related matters denied, made her third attempt to set aside the Court's order by filing a Motion 
for Stay before the Utah Court of Appeals which was heard on the 19th day of August, 1998 and, on 
the following day, the Utah Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's motion. (Record, Utah Court of 
Appeals). 
29. Petitioner has now filed her Notice of Appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals. (Record, 
Utah Court of Appeals). 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
PETITIONER'S FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN 
FAVOR OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND 
DEMONSTRATE WHY, IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECISION. 
Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's findings and demonstrate 
why, in the light most favorable to the Court's findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. The Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to do the following: 
1. Properly apply the changed circumstances rule relying on Becker v. Becker, 
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694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984); Parvzek v. Parvzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 
1989); Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989); and Barnes v. 
Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. That the trial court, as a matter of law, erred in changing custody where it 
found the child is thriving, well adjusted, and happy, once again relying on 
Parvzek, supra; 
3. The trial court erred as it related to its findings regarding moral character, 
religious compatibility with the child, kinship, and the relative strength of the 
child's bond with one or more parents, alleging an abuse of discretion and 
relying on Barnes, supra; 
4. That the custody evaluation was flawed and procedurally unfair, once again 
relying on Barnes, supra; and 
5. Finally, in awarding attorneys fees to Respondent relying on Sigg v. Sigg, 
905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995). 
The Petitioner argues the same evidence that was elicited during trial and does not 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. This Court has ruled, in the 
case ofSchindlerv. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989) that: 
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's factual findings, an 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
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findings, or that its findings are otherwise clearly erroneous." (Citing Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
Petitioner asks this court to set aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on 
nothing more than a "shot gun" approach pointing out only those things in the record that support 
their position, without adhering to the criteria set forth in Schindlen and by doing so the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated, in any way, shape, or form, that the evidence in this case was insufficient to 
support the Court's findings, and should be precluded from reasserting her claim again. 
Another case directly on point is Ohline Corp., v. Granite Mill 849 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 
1993). In that case this Court stated: 
"An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence', thus making them clearly erroneous" . . . "If the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes 
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to 
a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case". 
Id. At 603-694 quoting In re: Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Saunders v. 
Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
This Court held that Ohline had failed to marshal the evidence. Instead, Ohline merely 
selected facts from trial that were most favorable to its position and then reargued those facts on 
appeal. Ohline, Id at 604. 
In the case at bar, Petitioner has merely selected those facts which are most favorable to her 
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position, which have already been argued in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis 
County, State of Utah, and is now rearguing those facts on appeal. Petitioner has neither marshaled 
the evidence in favor of the Court's findings nor demonstrated its insufficiency in the light most 
favorable to those findings. Therefore, Petitioner's claims should be rejected. 
POINTII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE CHANGED 
CIRCUMSTANCES RULE IN CONJUNCTION WITH UTAH 
LAW TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE PARTIES 
PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO A STIPULATED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE AWARDING BOTH PARENTS JOINT LEGAL 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD. 
Petitioner argues that the parties stipulated and agreed, at the time of the divorce, that 
Petitioner was awarded sole physical custody and control of the minor child, Jackson Wade 
Carpenter, born May 28, 1992, with reasonable rights of visitation awarded to Respondent. This 
paragraph in Petitioner's brief is mis-stated and, in fact, the parties were awarded the joint care, 
custody and control of the minor child with Petitioner being awarded physical custody of said child. 
(Appellant Brief add. 4,1f2). 
This case, at the time of the original divorce, was clearly a non-litigated, stipulated custody 
arrangement whereby the parties were awarded joint legal custody of the minor child. Petitioner now 
argues that the trial court failed to properly apply the changed circumstances rule in an un-
adjudicated decree and Petitioner basically relies on Elmer (supra). Once again, Petitioner only cites 
to those holdings in Elmer which support her position which flies in the face of "marshaling the 
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evidence". The Utah Supreme Court made it perfectly clear in Elmer that: 
"Custody decrees are not always adjudicated and when they are not, 
the res judicata policy underlining the changed-circumstances rule is 
at a particularly low ebb. Even more importantly, an un-adjudicated 
custody decree is not based on an objective, impartial determination 
of the best interests of the child. When a child's custody is 
determined by stipulation or default, the custody determination may 
in fact be in odds with the best interests of the child. (See 
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y. 2d 89,432 N.E. 2d 765,447 
N.Y.S. 2d 893 (1982). When based on a stipulation or default, a 
custody decree may reflect such fortuitous and extraneous factors as 
improper influence exercised by one parent over the other or a 
temporary loss of resolve by one parent caused by stress, guilt, or 
financial distress that causes that parent to give into the demands of 
the other. Whether the best interests of the child are in fact served by 
a custody arrangement determined by stipulation or default, therefore, 
is often just plainly fortuitous. By contrast, a judicial determination 
of custody based on the child's best interest is based on an objective 
and impartial comparison of the parenting skills, character, and 
abilities of both parents in light of a realistic and objective appraisal 
of the needs of a child." Id at 603 (Emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Elmer, also cited Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 629 (Utah 
1987) in which Chief Justice Hall and the author in the opinion in Elmer, noted that the changed-
circumstances rule should not be rigidly applied when custody was based on an un-adjudicated 
decree. Id. In the case at bar we had a non-adjudicated custody decree awarding both parents joint 
custody of their son. After the divorce was final, the Respondent relocated from Layton, Utah to 
Brian Head, Utah where he remarried, and had another child (Tr. 158). Petitioner, also relocated 
during the middle of the custody evaluation from Layton, Utah to the State of Arizona (Tr. 348). The 
parties were also having arguments as it relates to visitation and it became clear to Respondent that 
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Petitioner would not facilitate visitation with Respondent and also that the Petitioner and Respondent 
could no longer communicate and work together as joint custodial parents (Tr. 174 - 175). The 
parties also stipulated during the trial of this matter that the joint custody arrangement they had 
entered into at the time the decree of divorce was entered was no longer workable (Tr. 474), and 
Petitioner herself, at the time of trial, sought a termination of the joint custody order and requested 
sole custody of Jackson Wade Carpenter to her (Tr. 471). 
The trial courts Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are clearly supported by the 
evidence and the case law in the State of Utah. First of all, the trial court considered all factors 
enunciated in Elmer and, in fact referred to Elmer, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(Appellant Brief add. no. 1, page 3, f 5). Second, the evidence, by way of stipulation of the parties, 
was that the joint legal custody order previously entered into was no longer workable. 
Section 30-3-10.4(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) specifically states as follows: 
(1) on the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court 
may, after a hearing, modify an order that established joint legal 
custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both 
custodians have materially and substantially changed 
since the entry of the order to be modified, or the 
order has become unworkable or inappropriate under 
existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the 
decree would be an improvement for and in the best 
interest of the child. (Emphasis added). 
The trial court properly considered the changed circumstances based on the joint custody 
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order, the parties stipulation that joint custody was no longer workable, the fact that both parties were 
seeking sole custody of the minor child, the fact that the circumstances of the child or one or both 
of the custodial parents had changed, as well as the recognized case law in the State of Utah. 
Therefore, the trial court's findings were clearly supported by the evidence. 
Petitioner next argues that even assuming there has been a change in circumstance, the trial 
court still erred by failing to explain the necessary nexus between the changed circumstances and the 
welfare of the child. Petitioner relies upon Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984). There are 
distinct analogies between Becker and the case at bar. In Becker, the Respondent was awarded sole 
custody of the parties minor child. Id at 608. Therefore, the rational behind Becker, was there must 
be a substantial and material change in circumstance to justify re-opening the question of custody 
and then a party must show, in addition to the existence and extent of the change, that the change is 
significant in relation to the modification sought. Id at 609. Petitioners argument on this point must 
fail. As stated above, the parties in this matter stipulated that the joint custody arrangement was no 
longer workable and also both parties sought sole custody of the minor child. Because the "low ebb" 
standard applies as it relates to a change in circumstances in conjunction with Elmer supra, as well 
as §30-3-10 .4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), the theory as outlined in Becker, is misplaced. 
Therefore, the trial court properly found that it could start anew to determine custody of the 
child because of the joint custody arrangement and because it was found to be unworkable. The trial 
court also properly considered the res judicata aspect of the changed circumstance rule and therefore 
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committed no error in finding that sole custody should be awarded to Respondent. 
POINTIII 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED THE 
PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT. 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly supported the courts findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in relationship to the previously determined custody arrangement. The trial court made 
detailed findings relating to this factor (Appellant Brief add. no. 1, page 714). Petitioner argues that 
the trial court committed a reversible error by not appropriately considering stability as a factor 
regarding the general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements. Petitioner 
relies on Parvzek v. Parvzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989). While this court has made it a general 
rule that stability is an important factor in determining a child's best interest, this court held in 
Parvzek: 
"The child's interest in stability of the present environment is one of 
numerous factors to be considered in a custody determination In 
the present case the child resided with his father under the temporary 
custody order for in excess of two (2) years. The findings should 
reflect the basis for the trial courts conclusion that other factors 
before it outweighed the child's interest in stability of the home 
environment." (Emphasis added). 
The trial court adhered to this courts ruling in Parvzek and in fact, made specific and detailed 
findings relating to all factors a trial court should consider when adjudicating a custody matter for 
the first time and in fact, the trial court did exactly what it is suppose to do and that is, as is stated 
in Parvzek "the overriding consideration in child custody determinations is the child's best interests". 
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Citing Hutchinson v. Hutchinson. 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). Id at 81. Once again, the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were certainly supported by the evidence which was 
presented at trial. 
Finally, Petitioner argues to this court that the trial court erred in not making one single 
finding of fact as it related to the impact upon Jackson of the change of custody in this case. To the 
contrary, if one takes a detailed look at the extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only 
concern the trial court had was the best interest of the minor child. The court also based its 
conclusion on the testimony of Margaret Chapman as well as the testimony of V. Gerald Thamert, 
L.C.S.W. The testimony at trial from Mr. V. Gerald Thamert centered around Jackson Carpenter's 
best interest. Mr. Thamert was privy to the report prepared by Margaret Chapman, the reference 
letters, and autobiographies prepared by the respective parties (Tr. 136). Mr. Thamert concurred 
with the conclusions set forth by Margaret Chapman, however, he testified he would have written 
the custody report in a manner that was not "quit so saving of people's feelings" (Tr. 137). Mr. 
Thamert further testified that from reading Petitioner's autobiography she was "a wounded person 
who has difficulty separating herself from her child's needs" (R.138). 
Mr. Thamert further testified that from the information available to him, the minor child was 
more closely bonded to his father in that the relationship with his mother and father are different. 
Stated another way, Mr. Thamert believed that there was a higher quality relationship between 
Respondent and his son versus Petitioner and her son. (Tr. 139). Mr. Thamert also testified that Mr. 
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Carpenter is much more amenable to establishing a visitation schedule that works for both parents 
but in particular one that works for the parties minor son and that there was a greater likelihood that 
Respondent will encourage visitation and continue contact with Petitioner than there is the other way 
around (Tr.139). This testimony by Mr. Thamert corroborates the testimony of Respondent as is 
evident by Petitioner's testimony as set forth in the record. More particularly (Tr.95) whereby 
Petitioner stated that she decreased the visitation after Respondent filed his Petition to Modify. 
Petitioner also asserts that Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires 
psychological testing to be done during custody evaluations and that a qualified psychologist must 
perform those tests. Petitioner's assertion that psychological evaluations must be performed 
pursuant to Rule 4-903 is a complete mis-statement of the rule. For that reason and the reasons set 
forth above, the trial court's findings as it relates to the previously determined custody arrangement 
was proper in all respects and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINTIV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SET FORTH THE CRITERIA 
IN RULE 4-903, UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
IN DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PARTIES 
MINOR CHILD. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court's findings as it relates to the requirements of Rule 4-903 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration did not justify the conclusions of law reached by the 
court. Once again, Petitioner re-asserts the same arguments that were made at trial and the same 
arguments that were made in relationship to Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, that is they want to 
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argue each individual factor rather than considering all factors as a whole. In fact, Petitioner's 
second lawyer, Mr. Brent Chipman, on cross-examination of the court appointed custody evaluator, 
Margaret Chapman, went through each factor one at a time. (Tr. 53-68). However, Petitioner's 
argument is flawed because on re-direct examination Ms. Chapman was asked "do all of the factors 
considered collectively warrant your recommendation that sole custody be awarded to Mr. 
Carpenter" Ms. Chapman's answer: "I believe that it does" (Tr. 81). Ms. Chapman further testified 
that she considered what trauma, if any, the change of custody would have on Jackson. Ms. 
Chapman testified that she did not think there would be any trauma on Jackson because of the 
relationship he has with his father (Tr. 68). 
Without going through each one of the factors as set forth in Rule 4-903, it is abundantly 
clear that the court appointed custody evaluator, Ms. Margaret Chapman, took each one of those 
factors into account when she conducted her custody evaluation (Tr. 30). The record is clear 
throughout Ms. Chapman's testimony, cross examination, and re-direct examination that her main 
concern was the best interest of the child (Tr. 25 - 80). It is somewhat ironic that Petitioner even 
agrees that the trial court found four (4) factors in Rule 4-903 to favor Respondent yet, somehow 
tries to rely on the previously determined custody arrangement as the "controlling factor". The fact 
is, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of the minor child and there was no previously 
determined custody arrangement and, therefore, any argument Petitioner may make is flawed, not 
supported by the evidence, and the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as it relates 
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to the criteria set forth in Rule 4-903 are all supported by the testimony and evidence presented at 
trial. 
POINT V 
THE CUSTODY EVALUATION WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH 
RULE 4-903, CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND 
WAS NOT FLAWED AND/OR PROCEDURALLY UNFAIR. 
Petitioner argues that Margaret Chapman's evaluation is flawed due to the unfair and 
inappropriate manner in which the evaluation was conducted. First of all, Ms. Chapman was 
appointed by the court to conduct the custody evaluation (add. no. 1). The fact that Petitioner was 
extremely concerned about Ms. Chapman residing in Southern Utah is irrelevant; the same analogy 
could be drawn if Judge Allphin would have appointed a custody evaluator from Northern Utah then 
Respondent would be claiming that the custody evaluation was flawed and/or unfair because he lives 
in Southern Utah and perhaps, there is some bias because the custody evaluator would have been 
from Northern Utah. This position flies in the face of Rule 4-903 which requires that one evaluator 
should perform the evaluation on both parties unless one of the prospective custodians resides 
outside the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, the only custodian that resided outside the 
jurisdiction of the court was the Respondent, Mr. Wade Carpenter and nowhere in the record was 
there ever a motion filed or application made to the court to appoint two (2) separate custody 
evaluators to provide one written report to the court which is also provided for under Rule 4-903. 
Petitioner argues that, among other things, one of the flaws in Ms. Chapman's report relates 
19 
to Ms. Chapman meeting Petitioner in Jackson's home environment while Petitioner was in the 
process of moving to Gilbert, Arizona. First of all, the custody evaluation was ordered prior to 
Petitioner ever moving to Gilbert, Arizona and therefore, her move was at her own discretion and 
election. Secondly, the court appointed custody evaluator still met with Petitioner, in her home in 
Layton, Utah, which was the familiar surrounding to the minor child. Petitioner's argument on this 
point is ludicrous, at best. 
Petitioner next argues that the court appointed custody evaluator had numerous contacts with 
Respondent, his new wife, and Respondent's attorney, James M. Park, who were all located in 
Southern Utah near her office and where she resided. This argument is disingenuous, a complete 
lie, and a complete mis-statement of the record. Ms. Chapman testified that she spent nearly equal 
time with the parties but did have more telephone calls from Respondent than Petitioner (Tr. 48-49). 
Ms. Chapman also testified that she met Respondent's attorney, Mr. Park, at his office, on one 
occasion, and one occasion only, where nothing about the custody evaluation was discussed, but 
maybe a brief conversation about "golf (Tr. 49). The testimony of Margaret Chapman alone should 
be enough to convince this court that Petitioner's Appellate Brief is nothing more than an attempt 
to re-try this case for the fourth time. There were no ex- parte communications out of court between 
Respondent's attorney and Ms. Chapman and the record is clear that the only other occasion in which 
Respondent's attorney met with Ms. Chapman was the day of trial and, in fact, Respondent's 
attorney was the one who Subpoenaed Ms. Chapman to testify. Nowhere in any case law or in Rule 
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4-903 can Petitioner cite that it is inappropriate for litigants involved in a custody evaluation to not 
be allowed to contact a custody evaluator and/or to actively participate in the custody evaluation. 
To the contrary, Petitioner made a conscious effort not to participate in the custody evaluation 
and, in fact, testified that she was to busy raising a son and that in hind sight she would have paid 
more attention to the custody evaluation (Tr. 346-347). 
Petitioner next argues that Ms. Chapman informed Petitioner that she should provide only 
three (3) letters of reference from employers and clergy, not family members. Petitioner then argues 
that had Jillynn Stevens, the sister of Petitioner, been contacted by Ms. Chapman it would have been 
extremely important to Petitioner's case in that Jillynn Stevens is likewise a licensed clinical social 
worker. This is yet another example of how Petitioner attempts to mislead this court as to the actual 
facts and evidence presented at trial. The testimony adduced at trial was that Ms. Chapman did ask 
Petitioner for any other references at least three (3) weeks prior to the time the custody evaluation 
was complete (Tr. 344). In fact, Petitioner testified "I was trying to keep family members out of it 
and to give her an objective view of . . . from the people around me" (Tr. 345). Once again, 
Petitioner is trying to mislead this court and dilute the facts in a position most favorable to Petitioner 
and not in the light most favorable to the courts findings of fact and conclusions of law which, 
referring back to Point I, does not constitute "marshaling the evidence". 
Petitioner next argues that the Chapman evaluation is flawed because no psychological tests 
whatsoever were administered by the evaluator to either of the parents or the child. For the 
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Petitioner to be successful on this argument they would first have to show that it is mandatory, 
pursuant to Rule 4-903 that each time a custody evaluator is appointed that psychological testing 
must be performed. Because that is not the requirement under Rule 4-903, any argument to this 
extent must fail. As an interesting foot note to this argument by Petitioner however, Respondent 
testified that, to become a police officer he had to undergo physical, psychological, polygraph, and 
drug screen tests including the MMPI series which he took in 1995 (Tr.151). What is ironic about 
this argument set forth by Petitioner is that she considered psychological testing and, in fact, it was 
mentioned to her by her second attorney, Mr. Brent R. Chipman (R. 487). However, the Petitioner, 
for whatever reason, elected not to undergo psychological testing even though it was suggested to 
her by former counsel. Once again, another misstatement by Petitioner and yet another attempt to 
manipulate the facts in hopes that this court will not conduct a through review of the record, unlike 
the trial court judge, who heard from fourteen (14) witnesses, three (3) of them being expert 
witnesses, during a two (2) day trial. 
As it relates to Point IV, Petitioner finally argues that the Chapman evaluation was flawed 
because she failed to take into account the general interest in continuing the previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. Once again, Petitioner has 
misstated the evidence that was presented because Ms. Chapman did take into consideration this 
factor (Tr. 67). Further, Ms. Chapman, not only taking this factor into consideration, taking all other 
factors collectively, determined that because of the relationship Jackson had with his father, changing 
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custody would not create any disturbance to Jackson (Tr. 68). 
Petitioner attempts to refute the testimony of the court appointed custody evaluator, Margaret 
Chapman as well as V. Gerald Thamert, L.C.S.W. by the testimony of Petitioner's expert, Mr. Kim 
D. Peterson, M.S.W. who reviewed the Chapman evaluation and testified that Ms. Chapman's 
opinion was not justified upon her report (Tr. 426-427). What Petitioner fails to state as it relates 
to the testimony of Mr. Peterson is the cross examination by Respondent's counsel which goes as 
follows: 
Q: Mr. Peterson, if you would have been ordered to conduct this home study, 
and you would have had the opportunity to have interviewed Mrs. Hudema, 
Mr. Carpenter, see them interact with the child, personally talk to the 
references, made your notes, you would have been in a much better position, 
would you not, to make a determination as to what is in the best interest of 
this minor child? 
A: I would be, yes. (Tr. 430) 
Unlike Ms. Chapman who personally interviewed all participants as well as references, and 
Mr. Thamert who reviewed the custody evaluation, autobiographies, and notes of Ms. Chapman, Mr. 
Peterson reviewed the written report of Ms. Chapman only, rather than talking to her, reviewing 
notes, autobiographies, or trying to acquire any additional information that would help him formulate 
his opinion (Tr. 430-433). Further, the expert for Petitioner testified that because he did not hear 
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Margaret Chapman's testimony he can not really say what his recommendation would be because 
he had no idea how strongly she stated her opinion and had no idea what she based her opinion on. 
(Tr. 432-433). 
Once again, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court as it relates to the 
manner in which the custody evaluation was performed together with the testimony of Margaret 
Chapman and V. Gerald Thamert, are supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
POINT VI 
IN CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, PETITIONER HAS USED AND 
CITED TO MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE RECORD WHICH IS 
INAPPROPRIATE, IRRELEVANT, AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
Petitioner has cited to matters outside of the record, which were stricken by the trial court and 
should not be considered on appeal. In particular, Petitioner has cited to the following: 
(a) Affidavit of Carol Mellen and (b) Jillynn Stevens (See page 46, footnote no. 25 of Appellants 
brief). While they are contained in the court record, they were nonetheless stricken by the trial court 
judge and Petitioner did not attack the trial court's findings in striking said affidavits. If this court 
is to consider the affidavits mentioned above, this court should also consider the affidavit of V. 
Gerald Thamert, L.C.S. W. (R. 605), which clearly states that the longer Jackson Wade Carpenter is 
in the care of his mother, the more detrimental it will be to him. 
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The Petitioner knows better than to argue said matters on appeal without challenging the trial 
courts findings that the affidavits were stricken which the trial court made perfectly clear in its order 
dated June 24,1998 (Appellant Brief Add. no. 3, page 2). It is astounding how Petitioner submits 
evidence to this court which has been stricken at the trial court level to procure some type of 
sympathy and/or to try to convince this court that it is not in the best interests of Jackson Wade 
Carpenter to be with his father when these particular affidavits could have easily been produced at 
trial. As was stated earlier, Jillynn Stevens is the sister of the Petitioner and was present throughout 
the entire trial and Dr. Mellen resides in the State of Arizona and certainly could have been available 
for trial in that Petitioner relocated to the State of Arizona some six (6) months prior to the time of 
trial. The Respondent properly filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Jillynn Stevens and Dr. Carol 
Mellen relying on Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982) (R. 652-660). The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that affidavits clearly constitute evidence and that under Rule 59(a), newly proffered 
evidence is admissible under sub part (4), which requires that the proffered evidence be newly 
discovered and that said evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at the trial. The trial court properly ruled that all evidence submitted by Petitioners, with 
the exception of the affidavit by Petitioner herself, was not newly discovered evidence and therefore 
was stricken. This is yet another "back door" attempt to persuade this court to overturn the decision 
of the trial court, however, the arguments in this respect are irrelevant and immaterial, and has 




THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS 
PROPER BASED ON THE FRIVOLOUS POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
FILED BY PETITIONER. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in granting Respondent his attorney fees at it relates 
the post-trial motions filed by Petitioner's third attorney, Larry R. Keller. Respondent filed his 
motion for attorney fees (R. 661), however, the record is not clear as to where the affidavit of 
attorney fees submitted by James M. Park appears in the record. The affidavit of attorney fees is 
located in file no. 4, pages 670 to conclusion, first document which is the affidavit of attorneys fees 
filed by James M. Park as it related to the work he had performed in conjunction with Petitioner's 
motion for new trial and other related matters. 
Petitioner argues that Respondent's claim for attorney fees dealt with Petitioner's motion for 
new trial only. This is nonsensical and misplaced. The Petitioner's motion for new trial and other 
related matters consisted in excess of 355 pages of affidavits and exhibits which the trial court found 
to be irrelevant, not newly discovered evidence, and all affidavits and exhibits were stricken by the 
trial court with the exception of the affidavit submitted by Petitioner herself. The trial court ruled, 
and properly so, that Respondent was awarded attorney fees not because the motion filed by 
Petitioner was frivolous but rather because "counsel for Petitioner should have known better than 
to have attempted to support such motions with various inappropriate affidavits, letters and exhibits 
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in essentially attempting to re-try the case with evidence that could have been presented at trial 
(R.721). Likewise, the trial court property ruled that §30-3-3(2) allows for an award of attorney fees 
if the court determines that a party substantially prevails upon the claim or defense. It was necessary 
for Respondent to defend against all stricken exhibits and affidavits, and to travel from Cedar City, 
Utah to Salt Lake City, Utah to argue said motions, once again at the request of Petitioner which 
occurred on May 19,1998. Clearly this was an action under title 30, chapter 3,4 or 5 and therefore, 
statutorily, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Respondent his attorney fees for 
having to defend against the frivolous affidavits and exhibits filed by Petitioner's attorney. 
POINT VIII 
PURSUANT TO RULE 33 AND RULE 24(k), UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL FOR THE REASON THAT 
PETITIONERS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS, WITHOUT MERIT, 
INACCURATE, MISLEADING AND BURDENSOME. 
The Respondent requests this court for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure which states: 
(a) except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34 and/or 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the parties attorney. 
This Defendant also seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 24(k) which states: 
All briefs under this rule must be precise, presented with accuracy, 
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logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorneys fees against the 
offending lawyer. 
Respondent's first contention is that the appeal is frivolous. The lower court made detailed 
findings regarding the lower ebb necessary for changed circumstances, and applying the criteria 
pursuant to rule 4-903 accordingly. Further, the trial court heard testimony from 14 witnesses, three 
(3) of whom were expert witnesses, two (2) for Respondent and one (1) for Petitioner. Based on the 
fact that the trial court followed proper procedure determining that sole custody should be awarded 
to Respondent, the Petitioner's appeal is frivolous. The same holds true with Petitioner continually 
misstating the facts, not marshaling the evidence as required by Utah law, and asking this court to 
review affidavits of Jillynn Stevens and Dr. Carol Mellen which were stricken by the trial court. 
Once again the Respondent is answering to the same allegations that were previously argued during 
Petitioner's motion for new trial and again during Petitioner's motion for stay before this court. As 
a final note, in order for a person to be successful as it relates to a motion for stay, they must prove 
that they have a very good likelihood of being successftil on appeal. Petitioner's motion for stay was 
denied. 
The Petitioner also has failed to marshal the evidence with regard to all issues they have 
presented which is necessary under the policies and procedures of the reviewing court. While this 
argument has been discussed in point I of Respondent's brief, the Respondent further relies on 
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Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme Court, in Eames, recognized the 
right of a party to attempt to correct what that party deems to be an error in the court below. 
However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that "when there is no basis for the argument presented 
and when the evidence or law is mis-characterized an misstated, the court must question the parties 
motives." That is exactly what has happened in Petitioner's brief. The Petitioner has mis-
characterized and misstated the evidence to this court by setting forth arguments and referring to 
exhibits which were stricken by the trial court. Because of the Petitioner's conduct, this Respondent 
has had to defend himself against misleading and misstated information presented by the Petitioner. 
Should this court view Petitioner's appeal worthy of consideration and not subject to the 
effect of Rule 33(a) sanctions, this Respondent nonetheless is entitled to an award of attorneys fees 
pursuant to Rule 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
This Respondent feels it is necessary to parallel his conclusion in conjunction with the 
conclusion set forth in Petitioner's brief. Petitioner has argued throughout the fifty (50) pages of 
their brief that there can be nothing as disheartening as the removal of a child from his mother when 
there was some indicia of evidence that the child was happy, well adjusted, and thriving. 
Throughout Petitioner's brief all she talks about is that this child was removed from her care. 
Nowhere do they discuss what is in the best interest of the minor child which is precisely the reason 
behind the trial courts decision that sole custody should be awarded to Respondent. 
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Petitioner continues to have the "poor me" syndrom throughout her brief, however, 
Respondent believes that it is imperative for this court to understand the vindictiveness which lies 
within the Petitioner yet not brought to the surface by Petitioner in her brief. Two perfect examples 
of the vindictiveness of the Petitioner are as follows: 
L When Petitioner found out that a neighbor had written a letter of reference to 
Margaret Chapman which was favorable to Respondent, she promptly submitted a 
letter to said reference, that reference being a Ms. Kaylynn Briggs (Tr.335-336, 
exhibit 11). 
2. Petitioner also sent a letter to Respondent's wife, the minor child's step-mother as 
well as the mother to Jackson Wade Carpenter's half-sister that she should only 
contact Respondent's wife in case of emergency (Tr. 101-102, exhibit 2). 
These are only two examples of the true light which depict Petitioner and her personality. 
Both Margaret Chapman and V. Gerald Thamert, expert witnesses, were correct when they drew the 
conclusion that Respondent would be much more inclined to foster visitation with Jackson and his 
mother which would provide a healthy and nurturing relationship with Jackson and his mother. 
Petitioner then argues in her conclusion that the only reason the child should be taken from 
a home when the child is well adjusted and happy is if there is abuse or neglect of the mother. This 
is simply not provided for in the case law in the State of Utah or in any statutory authority but rather 
the main concern is the best interest of the minor child. This Respondent finds it almost laughable 
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that Petitioner would set forth in her conclusion that this court should not take the child away from 
the mother who gave birth to him. This court can take judicial notice that a father, at least at present, 
cannot give birth to a child. To follow Petitioner's line of thinking would suggest that all mothers, 
who give birth to their children, should be given a preference in any custody case that is litigated. 
This is simply not the case. 
This case deals with parties previously stipulating to joint legal custody of their minor child. 
This was never a litigated judicial determination as to what is in the best interests of Jackson Wade 
Carpenter. (Emphasis added). The record is clear that throughout this child's life his father was an 
equal primary caretaker until his relocation to Brian Head and even then the Respondent was seeing 
his minor child ten (10) to fifteen (15) days per month. The Respondent in this case did not make 
a determination as to what was in the best interest of his minor child. That decision was made by 
the court appointed custody evaluator, Margaret Chapman, by V. Gerald Thamert, L.C.S.W. and by 
the trial court judge. Throughout the course of this two (2) day trial the tension was so high it felt 
like blood was going to pop out of your ears. The trial court had to read the expressions of the two 
(2) litigants, hear the testimony of fourteen (14) witnesses, and make a gut-wrenching decision as 
to what was in the best interest of the minor child. The trial court properly did so and did not act for 
either of the litigants but rather acted for the present and future well being of Jackson Wade 
Carpenter. 
Finally, Petitioner attempts to play on this courts sympathy by stating in their conclusion 
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"surely the well-known compassion of the Utah justice system must come into play correcting this 
terrible error by the trial court". The mistaken conclusion of Petitioner has been well founded by the 
record in this case and the detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the trial court 
judge. The tragedy is the Respondent's faith in the judicial system. By that Respondent means that 
he files a Petition for sole custody of his minor child, the court appoints a qualified custody 
evaluator, at the conclusion of the custody evaluation the Petitioner fires her first attorney; she then 
hires Brent R. Chipman who takes her through a two (2) day trial; at the conclusion of the trial when 
sole custody is awarded to Respondent she immediately fires her second lawyer; Petitioner then hires 
her third attorney, Larry R. Keller who files various motions including but not limited to a motion 
for new trial, motion for second custody evaluation, etc., all those motions are denied by the trial 
court judge; Petitioner then files a motion for stay with the Court of Appeals which is subsequently 
denied; and now Respondent is faced with Petitioner's notice of appeal. Stated another way, there 
has to be some closure on this case and the best interest of the minor child (which by the way are 
never mentioned by Respondent in their conclusion) are served by being with his father, the 
Respondent, Wade Carpenter. 
DATED this /S^day of January, 1999. 
THE PARK FIRM, P.C. 
Attomeys%r Respondent- Appellee 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, SIWFE 0F UTAH 





1 HON MICHAEL G. ALLPfflN 
ORDER APPOINTING A 
CUSTODY EVALUATOR 
Case No. 944701458 DA 
TO: THE CLERK OF COURT: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: MARGARET CHAMPMAN 
1065 Hemlock Circle 
St. George, Utah 84790 
Phone numbers: #674-7049 
#652-2969 
be appointed as CUSTODY EVALUATOR in this matter. Ms. Chapman is to 
submit a written report to the Court upon completion of the evaluation. 
Dated this P*f day of April, 1997 
o AEL G 
/ £]District Court Judge 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to.extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
